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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Statement of Facts
This is an appeal from the decision of the district court, the Honorable John T.

Mitchell upholding an award of attorney's fees based on contract. (R. 142). This dispute
arose from Plaintiff-Appellant, Alicia Gangi's (hereinafter "Gangi"), whom filed a suit
seeking a determination that the easement in question was not an exclusive easement and
the subsequent filings of her motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss with
prejudice. (R. 93). Thereafter, Gangi's motion to dismiss with prejudice was granted, the
district court awarded Defendant-Respondent, Mark DeBolt's (hereinafter "DeBolt"),
attorney's fees based on contract.
Looking at the nature of this case from the beginning, and what was asserted in the
complaint, what is really the crux of this dispute, is whether or not Gangi had the right to
use the water system for three residences, and this ties back to an agreement signed by Mr.
Art Elliot and his wife Trudy, and Dave Daboll back in 2000, and as seen as Exhibit "A" to
the Declaration of Mark DeBolt filed with the court on November 271\ 2019. (Tr. p. 6, L.
5).
Clarification that assists the Court in understanding where the parties started and
where they ended up, is that the predecessors-in-interest of both parties, Mr. and Mrs.
Elliot, were the owners of both properties that are the subject of this dispute. (Tr. p. 10, L.
6-8). They owned the now-Gangi parcel and the now-DeBolt parcel. (Tr. p. 10, L. 9-13).
The Elliots entered into an agreement with the adjoining landowner, Mr. Daboll
(hereinafter "Daboll") regarding use of the water system. In essence, this agreement
provided that an 8,000-gallon water reservoir would be put in; on which, a deck sits on top
of it. Each parcel, that being the Elliot parcel and the Daboll parcel, could hook up to that
system, and each parcel was allowed one single-family residence to be connected. (Tr. p.
10, L. 14-15). This agreement also contains an attorney fee provision that awards
attorney's fees for a party to the agreement that is seeking to enforce or interpret it. (Tr. p.
6, L. 19-22).
Within the underlying complaint, Gangi asserts that Plaintiff-Appellant's
predecessor in interest, the Elliots, and the DeBolts, agreed that an additional residence
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could be served by the existing water system and attempted to secure a water right that
allowed three (3) residences to be served by the existing system. (Tr. p. 6-7, LL. 23-25, 13). Essentially, what was brought up in this complaint was that Gangi would get to connect
to this water system governed by the subject agreement signed back in 2000 by Elliot and
Daboll, and that agreement bound Elliot as the applicable party, and stated that all future
owners of the property understood that there was going to be one ( 1) hookup for the Elliot
parcels. (Tr. p. 7, L. 4-11 ).
Moving forward to summary judgment, the case narrowed a bit. It went right into
enforcing a right to use a deck sitting on top of this water system as being "exclusive" or
"non-exclusive." (Tr. p. 7, L. 12-15). The crux of that argument was that the underlying
easement from 2012 was not clear that it was exclusive, so therefore, it had to be nonexclusive; and the district court ruled on summary judgment that there was a question of
fact. (Tr. p. 7, L. 15-19).
Following this decision from the court, Gangi filed a motion to dismiss the case
with prejudice; which essentially sought to get rid of this case because there was a question
of fact. (Tr. p. 7, L. 22-24). Arguably, this may have been a strategic move by Gangi to
avoid dealing with the underlying water system because it raises the subject 2000
agreement, whereas the focus is solely on the deck, but if the deck easement is nonexclusive, then presumably the water system is also, non-exclusive. (Tr. p. 8, L. 8-12).
Argument as to the grounds for attorney fees and costs by DeBolt was heard by the
district court at the January 28, 2020 hearing on DeBolt' s motion for attorney fees and
costs. Specifically, DeBolt raised argument that attorney fees and costs were provided
under the subject agreement which had been clearly referenced within the initial complaint.
(Tr. p. 9, L. 12-14). Further, that such agreement contained the provision that states that if
legal action was required or deemed necessary to enforce or interpret any provisions of
said agreement, the prevailing party was entitled to recover its costs, including reasonable
attorney's fees incurred in connection therewith. (Tr. p. 9, L. 14-20). Furthermore, that the
underlying complaint, which asserted that Gangi had the right to one, hook-up, which
would add two hookups to the prior Elliot parcel, called upon and applied, the 2000
agreement containing the subject attorney fees provision. (Tr. p. 9-10, LL. 22-25, 1-2).
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While argument by DeBolt at this January 28, 2020 hearing acknowledges the point
raised by Gangi, that she and DeBolt weren't parties to this 2000 agreement, as Elliot and
Daboll had signed the 2000 agreement, it was pointed out to the court that the predecessor
in interest to both Gangi and DeBolt, was Elliot. (Tr. p. 10, L. 5-8). Further highlighted by
DeBolt was the fact that when the Elliot parcel split, the rights of the parties were still
governed by the subject 2000 agreement as it ran with the land, and as such, after the split
of the Elliot parcel, only one single-family hookup to the water system was permissible.
(Tr. p. 10, L. 8-13). There is one single-family hookup on the Elliot parcel, which is now
two parcels, and that serves the DeBolt parcel. (Tr. p. 10, L. 14-15). Therefore, the dispute
as to whether this agreement allowed for three (3) hookups or not, invoked the attorney
fees clause contained thereunder said agreement. (Tr. p. 10, L. 16-20).
Despite Gangi's attempts to argue that the 2000 agreement, dealing with the water
system, didn't apply to this case as she had been arguing only over the deck, and not the
water system, was unpersuasive. (Tr. p. 10-11, LL. 21-25, 1-6). The initial pleadings
discussed the water system and being connected to it; as such, there was certainly an
agreement before the court that allowed an award of attorney's fees. (Tr. p. 11, L. 6-10).
The district court correctly found that there was an agreement in place that did
specifically provide for attorney fees, that it related to both aspects of this case-not only the
water right, but also the deck- and that it ran with the land. (Tr. p. 17-18, LL. 20-25, 1-4).
In sum, the court correctly found that the subject agreement ran with the land, therefore, it
applied. (Tr. p. 18, L. 5-11). In light of the lack of objection by Gangi as to the attorney fee
amount sought, the district court acted well-within its discretion in its award of attorney
fees and costs to DeBolt and should not be disturbed on appeal.

II.
A.

ARGUMENT

STANDARD OF REVIEW
An award of attorney's fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Ellis v. Ellis,

467 P.3d 365 (2020). If it is determined that when reviewing the court's discretionary
decision, we determine whether ( 1) the district court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with
applicable legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Blackmore
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v. Re/Max Tri-Cities, LLC, 149 Idaho 558,563,237 P.3d 655, 660 (2003).
On appeal, "a trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are
clearly erroneous." Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 855, 55 P.3d 304,
309 (2002); Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a). In applying that principle, the appellate
court cannot re-weigh the evidence ... or substitute the view of the facts for that of the
district court. Argosy Trust ex rel. v. Wininger, 141 Idaho 570, 572, 114 P.3d 128, 130
(2005). The appellate court's role is simply to determine whether there is evidence in
the record that a reasonable trier of fact could accept and rely upon in making the
factual finding that is challenged on appeal. Miller v. Callear, 140 Idaho 213, 216, 91
P.3d 1117, 1120 (2004). The district court's findings of fact will be liberally construed
in favor of the judgment entered. Beard v. George, 135 Idaho 685, 23 P.3d 147 (2001).
Further, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l), costs shall be allowed as a matter of right to
the prevailing party. Additionally, the district court is authorized to award attorney's fees
to the prevailing party when provided for by statue or contract. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l).

B.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
AWARDING DEBOLT ATTORNEY FEES BECAUSE IT WAS PROVIDED
FOR UNDER CONTRACT.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)( 1) provides that the costs shall be allowed as a

matter of right to a prevailing party in litigation. Rule 54(e)(1) allows that, "in any civil
action the court may award reasonable attorney fees ... to the prevailing party or parties as
defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(B)." Under Rule 54(d)(l)(B), to determine the prevailing party
the trial court should consider the "final judgment or result of the action in relation to the
relief sought by the respective parties." I.R.C.P. 54( d)(l )(B).
Here, there can be no doubt that DeBolt is the prevailing party over PlaintiffAppellant, Gangi. Gangi and De Bolt's dispute is centered around the sharing of a water
facility, as set forth under the underlying complaint. The agreement signed by Mr. Art
Elliot and his wife Trudy, and Dave Daboll in 2000, specifically states, "[t} he easement

and other rights, described in this agreement are intended to be perpetual, shall run with
the land, and shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of heirs, representatives,
successors and assigns of Elliot and Daboll with respect to the Elliot property and the
Daboll property." (Emphasis added). (Tr. p. 27-28, LL. 21-25, 1-3). The successors to the
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Elliots and the Dabolls, are Gangi and DeBolt, and such agreement further provides that if
legal action is required to enforce or interpret its provisions, the prevailing party is entitled
to recover attorney fees and costs. (Tr. p. 9, L. 13-20).
Gangi' s action, as understood by De Bolt and the district court, essentially sought to
eviscerate DeBolt's use of the water tank and therefore, invoking the terms of the subject
2000 agreement. This much is seen by the underlying complaint's reference to this
agreement. Gangi' s position that that attorney fees should not have been awarded because
Gangi and DeBolt were not parties to the original agreement between Elliot and Daboll
carries no water. If this Court were to uphold this theory, every easement in the state of
Idaho would be unenforceable against any new or subsequent owners that were not present
at the execution of such easement agreement. This outcome would be catastrophic to
many, especially railroad companies, utility companies, government entities, etc.
What transpired in this case was that a lawsuit was filed, a significant amount of
money was incurred to litigate this case, and an award for attorney fees and costs under
contract was granted by the district court. Gangi brought this case, didn't pursue it, and
decided to drop it, eventually using it as leverage to get DeBolt to comply with her wishes.
She was unsuccessful as the district court correctly found that the subject agreement
expressly provided that the rights under it ran with the land, for the benefit of successors,
and that such rights, were binding on successors; including the provision regarding
attorney fee awards. This case was pursued not only frivolously by Gangi, but also with the
intent to harass DeBolt into settling.
In short, the district court's original award of attorney fees and costs is not only
valid under the plain language of this disputed agreement (which is binding on the present
parties), but also proper given Gangi's lack of objection as to the specific amount sought.
This evidence is without a doubt, substantial and competent and must not be disregarded
here on appeal merely because Gangi disagrees with it.

III.

A.

PRAYER AND ARGUMENT FOR AWARD OF DEBOL T'S ATTORNEY
FEES AND COSTS.
DeBolt should be awarded his costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-107
and/or I.A.R. 40.
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"As to costs on appeal, as a matter of course, costs are awarded as to the prevailing
party under Idaho Code section 12-107 and Idaho Appellate Rule 40(a)." (Emphasis
added). Big Wood Ranch, LLC v. Water Users' Association of the Broadford Slough, 158
Idaho 225, 233, 345 P.3d 1015, 1023 (2015) (citing Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc.
v. MRI Assocs., LLP, 148 Idaho 479,501,224 P.3d 1068, 1090 (2009)).

B.

DeBolt should be awarded his attorney's fees on appeal.
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41(a), DeBolt asserts a claim to attorney's fees on

appeal. However, that Appellate Rule "does not provide authority to award attorney fees,"
so DeBolt prays this Court "permit a later claim for attorney's fees under such conditions
as it deems appropriate." LA.R. 41(a). Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 805, 241 P.3d
972, 978, (2010) (citing Swanson v. Kraft, Inc., 116 Idaho 315, 322, 775 P.2d 629, 636
(1989)).
Idaho Code section 12-117 allows attorney's fee awards on a judicial review
appeal. LC. §12-117(6)(e). DeBolt prays this Court finds that Gangi, the [non-prevailing
party] acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact. LC. §12-117(1). Because Gangi's
arguments presented in appeal are opaque and certainly not supported by substantial and
competent evidence cited in the Opening Brief, DeBolt must be the prevailing party and be
awarded his attorney's fees. LC. §12-117(1).
IV.

CONCLUSION

The irony here is striking. Plaintiff-Appellant believes that her act of ignoring the
fact that if one is going to file a lawsuit, they should certainly be aware of where they are
going with the lawsuit, especially when others are going to be incurring significant
amounts of money to litigate the case. To say that one domino falls and the other does not,
is disingenuous. If one has the right to go onto the disputed property to use the deck, they
are using the same right under the easement to use the water system as well. The disputed
easement contains express language providing for attorney fees; and makes no exception
for appeals. Defendant-Respondent respectfully requests that this Court affirm the District
Court's grant of an award of his attorney fees and award Defendant-Respondent his
attorney's fees and costs on appeal, and for such other relief as this Court deems equitable.
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DATED this 26 th day of October, 2020.
MADSEN LAW OFFICES, P.C.

By:

-~,------+-------1-

Alex N. Semanko,
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 26 th day of October, 2020, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Arthur M. Bistline
BISTLINE LAW, PLLC
1205 N. 3rd Street
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
service@bistlinelaw.com
Attorne
el/ant

□

U.S. Mail
□ Overnight Delivery
□ Hand Delivery
□ Facsimile:
181 Electronic Service

Kristin Berg
Paralegal to Alex N. Semanko
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